Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
Volume 0 National Center Proceedings 2017

Article 51

March 2017

Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout:
Barnabas v. Board of Trustees of U of DC

Follow this and additional works at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba
Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, and the Higher Education Commons

Recommended Citation
(2017) "Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: Barnabas v. Board of Trustees of
U of DC," Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy: Vol. 0, Article 51.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.58188/1941-8043.1703
Available at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/51

This Proceedings Material is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at The Keep. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy by an authorized editor of The Keep. For
more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

et al.: Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: B

Herbert, William 3/10/2017
For Educational Use Only

Barnabas v. Board of Trustees of University of District of..., 686 F.Supp.2d 95 (2010)
255 Ed. Law Rep. 795

686 F.Supp.2d 95
United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
Essica BARNABAS, Plaintiff,
v.
The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY
OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Motion for summary judgment granted in part and denied
in part.

West Headnotes (19)
[1]

Civil Action No. 07–02207 (JDB).
|
March 1, 2010.

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Civil Rights
Retaliation claims
District court would consider former university
employee’s claims for discrimination and
retaliation under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) under burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Synopsis
Background: Former University of the District of
Columbia professor, who was over 65 years old, brought
action under Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) against university, alleging that university
discriminated against her on basis of her age and
retaliated against her after she filed charge of
discrimination with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). University moved for summary
judgment.

Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

Holdings: The District Court, John D. Bates, J., held that:
[1]

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act did not revive professor’s
late-filed discrimination claim arising from her
non-promotion to full-time professor position;

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Civil Rights
Retaliation claims
Under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for analyzing claims under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a
plaintiff must first establish prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation by preponderance
of
evidence.
Age
Discrimination
in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

[2]

professor failed to show that university’s proffered
reason for not hiring her to fill vacancies for full-time
positions was unworthy of credence;
[3]

professor’s allegation that university hired younger
individuals to fill full-time positions was not enough to
survive summary judgment;

Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

fact issue precluded summary judgment as to retaliation
claim; and

[5]

fact that professor’s schedule was uncharacteristically
reduced following her protected activity necessarily could
support inference of mere knowledge on part of university
of such activity.

[3]

Civil Rights
Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements
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To show prima facie case of discrimination
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), a plaintiff must show that (1) she is
member of a protected class, (2) she suffered
adverse employment action, and (3) unfavorable
action gives rise to inference of discrimination.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

[6]

In asserting legitimate, non-discriminatory or
non-retaliatory explanation for an adverse
employment action, an employer seeking
summary judgment on Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claim need not
persuade district court that it was actually
motivated by proffered reasons; it is sufficient if
employer’s evidence raises genuine issue of fact
as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
seq.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

Civil Rights
Practices prohibited or required in general;
elements
Prima facie case of retaliation under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
requires a plaintiff to establish (1) that he
engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) that
he suffered materially adverse action by his
employer, and (3) that causal link connects the
two. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Civil Rights
Retaliation claims

Under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for analyzing claims under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
once a plaintiff establishes prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation, burden shifts to the
defendant
to
articulate
legitimate,
non-discriminatory
or
non-retaliatory
explanation for its actions. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

If
an
employer
offers
legitimate,
non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for
its adverse employment actions, district court
need not, and should not, decide whether the
plaintiff actually made out prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
under McDonnell Douglas; rather, sole inquiry
becomes whether employee produced sufficient
evidence for reasonable jury to find that
employee on prohibited basis, or, in other
words, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework essentially disappears and only
remaining issue is whether employer
discriminated or retaliated against employee.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote

Civil Rights
Age discrimination
Civil Rights
Retaliation claims

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/51
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1703

2

2

et al.: Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: B

Herbert, William 3/10/2017
For Educational Use Only

Barnabas v. Board of Trustees of University of District of..., 686 F.Supp.2d 95 (2010)
255 Ed. Law Rep. 795

[8]

employee to sustain Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claim in district
court. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 7(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1).
Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
In evaluating whether a plaintiff may overcome
summary judgment on Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) retaliation claim,
district court reviews each of three relevant
categories of evidence, namely, prima facie,
pretext, and any other, to determine whether
they either separately or in combination provide
sufficient evidence for reasonable jury to infer
retaliation. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
seq.

Cases that cite this headnote

[11]

Failure of University of the District of Columbia
to promote adjunct professor, who was over 65
years old, to full-time professor position was
not discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice within meaning of Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act, and thus Act did not revive
professor’s late-filed discrimination claims
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) arising from her non-promotion. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
7(d)(1, 3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1, 3).

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Civil Rights
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before Resort to Courts
An individual who wishes to challenge
employment
practice
under
the
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
must first file charge with Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
7(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1).
Cases that cite this headnote

[10]

Civil Rights
Deferral to state agencies; time
In District of Columbia, where there is local
anti-discrimination agency, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge must
be filed within 300 days of occurrence of
allegedly unlawful practice in order for an

Civil Rights
Continuing violations; serial, ongoing, or
related acts

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[12]

Civil Rights
Education, employment in
Civil Rights
Motive or intent; pretext
Former adjunct professor at University of the
District of Columbia, who was over 65 years
old, failed to show that discriminatory reason
likely motivated university’s decision not to hire
her as full-time professor, or that university’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not
hiring professor for full-time positions, namely,
that professor did not formally apply for
positions, was unworthy of credence, in light of
fact that employee had written multiple letters to
university expressing her interest in any regular
full-time professional vacancy, as required to
sustain discrimination claim under Age
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA);
there was no evidence that university typically
for
considered
“standing
applications”
employment, or that university told professor
that she need not submit application in order to
be considered for any available vacancies. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Cases that cite this headnote

[15]

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving

Cases that cite this headnote

[13]

Evidence that university’s non-retaliatory
explanation for its reduction of courseload of
adjunct
professor,
who
filed
age
discrimination
complaint
with
Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
was mere pretext could itself allow professor to
overcome summary judgment on her Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
retaliation claim against university. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
Education, employment in
Allegation of former adjunct professor at
University of the District of Columbia that
university hired younger individuals to fill
full-time professor positions, without more, was
not enough to survive summary judgment on her
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) claim based on her non-selection for
full-time positions. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Cases that cite this headnote

[16]

Cases that cite this headnote

[14]

Seven-month delay between protected activity
and an adverse employment action generally
does not suggest any causal connection between
the two, as required to sustain Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
retaliation claim. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether legitimate, non-retaliatory reason of
University of the District of Columbia for
reducing workload of adjunct professor, who
filed age discrimination complaint Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
complaint, namely, that professor claimed that
she could not work because of medical
problems, was pretext for retaliation, precluding
summary judgment as to professor’s retaliation
claim
against
university
under
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Civil Rights
Causal connection; temporal proximity

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[17]

Civil Rights
Causal connection; temporal proximity
Especially where a defendant retaliates at first
opportunity that is presented, a plaintiff will not
be foreclosed from making out prima facie case
of retaliation under Age Discrimination in
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[18]

Employment Act (ADEA) despite substantial
gap in time. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Attorneys and Law Firms

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Heather R. Skeeles–Shiner, Zuberi Bakari Williams,
Office of the Attorney General *99 for the District of
Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
Fact that schedule of adjunct professor at
University of the District of Columbia was
uncharacteristically reduced following her
protected activity, which was evidence that
supported inference of retaliatory motive,
necessarily could support inference of mere
knowledge on part of university of such activity,
as required to survive summary judgment on
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) retaliation claim. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

*98 David Raphael Levinson, Levinson Law Office,
Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHN D. BATES, District Judge.
Plaintiff Essica Barnabas alleges that her former
employer, the University of the District of Columbia (“the
University” or “UDC”), discriminated against her on the
basis of her age and retaliated against her after she filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Currently before the
Court is UDC’s motion for summary judgment. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and
deny in part UDC’s motion.

Cases that cite this headnote

BACKGROUND
[19]

Federal Civil Procedure
Employees and Employment Discrimination,
Actions Involving
To survive summary judgment on Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
retaliation claim, a plaintiff need not provide
direct evidence that his supervisors knew of his
protected activity; he need only offer
circumstantial evidence that could reasonably
support inference that they did. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

Essica Barnabas was born October 10, 1935. Def.’s Mot.
for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”) [Docket Entry 34], Exhibit 2
(Deposition of Essica Barnabas (“Barnabas Depo.”)),
7:20–22. She received her Ph.D in biology from Howard
University in 1972. See id., Exhibit 7 (Barnabas
Curriculum Vitae) 3. From 1974 until 2006, Barnabas
taught in UDC’s Department of Biological and
Environmental Sciences. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3. In
1997, Barnabas was working as an Associate Professor
when she lost her job as the result of a university-wide
workforce reduction. See Barnabas Depo. at 25:21–26:7.
The University immediately rehired Barnabas, but only as
an adjunct professor teaching on a semester-to-semester
basis. See id. 35:13–36:6.

Cases that cite this headnote
Barnabas was eager to return to her previous position as a
full-time professor. Accordingly, between 2000 and
2003, Barnabas wrote numerous letters to Dr. Freddie
Dixon, the chair of UDC’s Biological and Environmental
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Sciences Department, as well as to other UDC
administrators. In these letters, Barnabas asked that she be
promoted to a full-time professor, and requested that she
be appointed to specific teaching vacancies that were
then, or soon to be, available. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s
Mot. [Docket Entry 37], Exhibit 2 (letters from Barnabas
to various UDC officials). She was unsuccessful.
In 2004, a professor vacancy opened in UDC’s
Biological and Environmental Sciences Department (“the
Department”). It called for applicants with a “Ph.D in
Molecular Biology, Biochemistry, Immunology, or
related areas with post-doctoral training in Cancer or
Cancer-related research areas.” Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 4
(Barnabas EEOC packet, Letter from William Penn) 2.
Barnabas applied for this vacancy, but the University
instead filled the position with a thirty-three year-old
man. See Barnabas Depo. at 68:18–70:12; Def.’s Mot.,
Exhibit 5 (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Doc. Request), at 33.
In May 2005, UDC advertised two full-time Assistant
Professor positions in the Department, each listed under
vacancy number 04–38. Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 1 (Def.’s
Answers to Pl.’s Interrog. (“Def.’s Answers”)), No.
10–11. The Department hired a forty-five year-old woman
to fill the first position in August 2005, and soon
withdrew the second position because the department
lacked funding to fill it. Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 1 (Def.’s
Supp. Answers to Pl.’s Interrog.), No. 11. Barnabas
submitted an application for this position in February
2006, but the second vacancy had already been
withdrawn. See id.
UDC officials announced another full-time Assistant
Professor position in the Department in November 2005,
listed under vacancy number 05–74. Def.’s Answers at
No. 10. Barnabas did not formally apply for this position,
Barnabas Depo. at 85:1–17, and the department filled the
spot with a forty-nine year-old woman in *100 August
2006. See Def.’s Answers at No. 10; Def.’s Mot., Exhibit
5 (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Doc. Request), 33.
Between 1997 and 2006, Barnabas taught no fewer than
two courses per semester as an adjunct professor. See
Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 3 (Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s Interrog.
(“Pl.’s Answers”)), No. 5. In the fall semester of 2006,
however, the University offered Barnabas only one course
to teach. See Barnabas Depo. at 95:17–20. And in the
spring semester of 2007 Barnabas was also offered only
one course. Id. at 96:18–97:2. Barnabas could not teach
this class, however, because of health concerns with

commuting in icy weather and the demands of caring for
her sister. See id. at 97:3–99:12. Barnabas has not taught
since then because of health problems. See id. at
104:10–05:5; 107:16–17.
In January 2006, Barnabas filed a complaint with the
EEOC. In her complaint, she alleged that UDC engaged
in age discrimination when it failed to select her for the
2004 vacancy. See Def.’s Mot., Exhibit 4 (Barnabas
EEOC Packet, Complaint). Barnabas amended her EEOC
charge in November 2006 to list an additional claim of
age discrimination, and to allege that UDC reduced her
workload and compensation in the fall semester of 2006
in retaliation for her filing an EEOC complaint. Id.
(Barnabas EEOC Packet, Am. Complaint). After the
EEOC declined to prosecute her case, Barnabas brought
suit in this court, alleging violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–634. UDC has now moved for summary judgment
on all of Barnabas’s claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and
the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). The
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial
responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The moving party may successfully support its motion by
identifying those portions of “the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits” which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); see also Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining whether there exists a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment,
the court must regard the non-movant’s statements as true
and accept all evidence and make all inferences in the
non-movant’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). A non-moving party, however, must establish
more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence”
in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. By
pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the
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non-moving party, a moving party may succeed on
summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct.
2548. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505
(citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if
the non-movant fails to offer “evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Id. at 252,
106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION
I. McDonnell Douglas Framework
[1] [2] [3] [4]
The Court considers Barnabas’s claims for
discrimination and retaliation *101 under the
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Hall v. Giant Food,
Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1999) (applying
McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims). Under this
framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination or retaliation by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. To show a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives
rise to an inference of discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta,
284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing Brown v. Brody,
199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C.Cir.1999)). A prima facie case of
retaliation, similarly, requires a plaintiff to establish “(1)
that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that
he suffered a materially adverse action by his employer;
and (3) that a causal link connects the two.” Wiley v.
Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C.Cir.2007).
[5] [6]

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory or - retaliatory explanation for its
actions. See Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455
(D.C.Cir.2005).
In
asserting
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory or -retaliatory explanation, an
employer “need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the
defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct.
1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (citation omitted).

[7] [8]

If a defendant offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory
or - retaliatory reason for its actions, “the district court
need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff
actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d
490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008). Rather, the sole inquiry
becomes “whether the plaintiff produced sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s
asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual
reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis.” Adeyemi v.
Dist. of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C.Cir.2008).
In other words, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework essentially disappears and the only remaining
issue is whether the employer discriminated or retaliated
against the employee. See Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d
670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009) (applying this approach to
ADEA claims). In evaluating whether the plaintiff may
overcome summary judgment, “the court reviews each of
the three relevant categories of evidence—prima facie,
pretext, and any other—to determine whether they ‘either
separately or in combination’ provide sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.” Id. at 679
(quoting Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989,
996 (D.C.Cir.2002)).

II. Age Discrimination Claims
Barnabas alleges that UDC discriminated against her by
failing to select her for any of three full-time positions.1
The Court takes each in turn.

*102 A. 2004 Vacancy2
Barnabas alleges that UDC discriminated against her
when it filled the full-time position she applied for in
2004 with a much younger individual. UDC responds that
this claim should be dismissed because Barnabas failed to
file a timely complaint with the EEOC. See Pl.’s Mot. at
14–15.
[9]

[10]

“An individual who wishes to challenge an
employment practice under the ADEA must first file a
charge with the EEOC.” Faison v. Dist. Columbia, 664
F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.2009); see 29 U.S.C. §
626(d)(1). “In the District of Columbia, where there is a
local anti-discrimination agency, this charge must be filed
within 300 days of the occurrence of the allegedly
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unlawful practice.” Faison, 664 F.Supp.2d at 64.

B. Vacancy 04–38
Barnabas next alleges that UDC unlawfully failed to
hire her as an Assistant *103 Professor for vacancy
number
04–38.
UDC
offers
a
legitimate,
non-discriminatory explanation for its decision: Barnabas
did not formally apply for this vacancy until February
2006, months after the University had already filled the
position. See Def.’s Answers at No. 11.4 Therefore, “the
only question is whether the employee’s evidence creates
a material dispute on the ultimate issue of [discrimination]
‘either directly by [showing] that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.’ ” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678 (quoting
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403
(1983)) (second alteration in original).
[12]

Barnabas concedes that she failed to adhere to these
statutory requirements for her allegation concerning the
2004 vacancy: her EEOC complaint was filed well over
300 days after she was denied the position. See Def.’s
Opp’n at 4. Instead, she contends that the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5
(2009), revives her claim. The Lilly Ledbetter Act, as
incorporated into the ADEA, states that “an unlawful
practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in
compensation in violation of [the ADEA], when a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is
adopted, when a person becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or
when a person is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.”
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3). According to Barnabas, the
University’s decision not to grant her the 2004 position
was a “discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice” that still affected her salary at the time she filed
her 2006 EEOC complaint. See Def.’s Opp’n at 4–5.
Thus, she argues, her EEOC charge was timely filed.
Barnabas’s argument is foreclosed by the D.C. Circuit’s
recent decision in Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP, 595 F.3d 370 (D.C.Cir.2010). In that case, the
plaintiff argued that his employer’s failure to promote him
was a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice under the Lilly Ledbetter Act. According to him,
because his salary still suffered from the continued effects
of his employer’s failure to promote him, the Act
rendered timely his otherwise late-filed discrimination
claims. The D.C. Circuit rejected this contention, holding
that “the decision whether to promote an employee to a
higher paying position is not a ‘compensation decision or
other practice’ within the meaning of that phrase in the”
Lilly Ledbetter Act. Id. at 375. The Lilly Ledbetter Act
therefore “d[id] not revive [plaintiff’s] claims under the
ADEA.” Id.
[11]

Hence, UDC’s failure to promote Barnabas to a
full-time professor position was not a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice. The Lilly
Ledbetter Act does not revive Barnabas’s late-filed
allegations concerning the 2004 vacancy, and she has thus
failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies with
respect to this allegation.3

Barnabas concedes that she did not formally apply for the
04–38 vacancy until months after UDC filled the position.
She argues, however, that when this position was posted
she had “multiple outstanding applications pending with
[UDC] for any regular full time professorial vacancy.”
Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. She points to eleven letters she wrote to
various UDC officials between 2000 and 2003. See id.,
Exhibit 2. In these letters, Barnabas expressed her strong
desire to be reappointed to a full-time position, and
requested that she be awarded specific teaching vacancies.
See id.
These letters—written before vacancy number 04–38 was
posted—may indicate that Barnabas wished to be
appointed to any available full-time position. But nothing
in the record discredits UDC’s claim that it did not
consider Barnabas for the vacancy because she never
formally applied for it. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 496;
Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d
1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“Once the employer has
articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action
... the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the
reasons offered but whether the employer honestly
believes in the reasons it offers.” (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)). There is no evidence that
the University typically considers “standing applications”
for employment, or that UDC told Barnabas that she need
not submit an application in order to be considered for
any available professor vacancies. Indeed, UDC’s
evidence—irrefuted on this point—indicates that only
individuals who formally applied were considered for this
position. See Def.’s Answers at No. 11 (“The Plaintiff’s
resume and application had not been received by the
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Office of Human Resources and therefore was not
submitted for the first screening.”); id. at No. 14 (“The
Plaintiff was ineligible to be considered at the time of
[the] appointment because she had not submitted her
application for consideration at that time.”). Thus, nothing
suggests that the University’s explanation for its decision
not to hire Barnabas is false.

failure to apply for this job that removed her from
consideration. See Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183. And there
is nothing—save only for the fact that a younger
individual was hired—to suggest that discrimination
motivated the University’s decision. Without more,
Barnabas’s claim cannot survive summary judgment. See
Dunaway, 310 F.3d at 767.

[13]

In sum, no reasonable jury could conclude that UDC
intentionally discriminated against Barnabas on the basis
of her age. The Court will thus grant UDC summary
judgment as to all of Barnabas’s allegations of age
discrimination.7

Moreover, Barnabas has failed to identify evidence to
support her allegations of discriminatory intent. She has
not argued, for example, that she was more qualified than
the individual hired for this vacancy—herself forty-five
years-old. Nor has she suggested that UDC only
interviewed young applicants for the position. Indeed, at
her deposition Barnabas denied having “any interactions
with anyone at UDC that made [her] feel that [she was]
being discriminated against based on [her] age.” Barnabas
Depo. at 115:8–22. Thus, Barnabas’s charge of
discrimination rests *104 only on the fact that UDC hired
a younger individual to fill the position. Without more,
this is not enough to survive summary judgment. See
Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 767
(D.C.Cir.2002) (“[Defendants’] decision to replace
[plaintiff] with a younger woman is insufficient for a jury
to conclude that she ‘lost out because of [her] age ....’
[Plaintiff] proffered no other evidence that she was
terminated because of her age ....” (citations omitted)
(quoting O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517
U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996))).5

C. Vacancy 05–74
Finally, Barnabas suggests that UDC unlawfully failed to
hire her as an Assistant Professor for vacancy number
05–74. UDC offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory
explanation for this decision as well: Barnabas never
applied for the position. See Barnabas Depo. at 85:1–17.6
Accordingly, the Court turns to the “only question”
remaining: “whether the employee’s evidence creates a
material dispute on the ultimate issue of [discrimination].”
Jones, 557 F.3d at 678.
As with vacancy number 04–38, Barnabas’s argument
rests on the assumption that she had a standing
employment application pending when this position was
listed. But once again, the record lacks any evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that UDC
discriminated against Barnabas by not awarding her this
position. There is no evidence that the University did not
honestly and reasonably believe that it was Barnabas’s

III. Retaliation Claim
[14]
Barnabas has also alleged that UDC retaliated against
her by reducing her teaching load for the fall semester of
2006 after she filed a discrimination complaint with the
EEOC in January 2006. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19.
UDC offers a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for
its decision to reduce her teaching load—namely, that
Barnabas’s “schedule was not reduced until she reported
that she was unable to work because of medical
problems.” Def.’s Answers to Pl.’s Interrog. at No. 15.8
Thus, the question once again becomes “whether the
employee’s *105 evidence creates a material dispute on
the ultimate issue of retaliation.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678.
In analyzing this issue, the Court considers “each of the
three relevant categories of evidence—prima facie,
pretext, and any other—to determine whether they ‘either
separately or in combination’ provide sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.” Id. at 679
(quoting Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 996).
Here, Barnabas has provided evidence that UDC’s
explanation for its decision to reduce her schedule is false.
UDC contends that Barnabas’s schedule was only reduced
after she claimed to the University that she could not
work. But UDC does not identify any instance where
Barnabas “reported that she was unable to work because
of medical problems” before the fall 2006 semester. And
Barnabas stated at her deposition that it was in January
2007—months after her teaching load was reduced—that
she first informed her department chair that she would
have trouble commuting in the icy weather conditions, in
part due to health concerns. Barnabas Depo. at 97:3–99:9.
Taken in the light most favorable to Barnabas, then, the
evidence directly contradicts UDC’s non-retaliatory
explanation for its reduction of Barnabas’s schedule, and

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Published by The Keep, 2017

9

9

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 12 [2017], Art. 51

Herbert, William 3/10/2017
For Educational Use Only

Barnabas v. Board of Trustees of University of District of..., 686 F.Supp.2d 95 (2010)
255 Ed. Law Rep. 795

a reasonable jury could infer that the University’s
explanation is mere pretext.
[15]

Evidence that UDC’s non-retaliatory explanation for
its actions is mere pretext may itself allow Barnabas to
overcome summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (trier of fact may “infer the ultimate
fact of [retaliation] from the falsity of the employer’s
explanation”); Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (“[T]hough
evidence of pretext is not per se sufficient to permit an
inference of [retaliation], it [u]sually ... will be enough to
get a plaintiff’s claim to a jury.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). Here, though, there is further
evidence of a temporal proximity between Barnabas’s
filing of an EEOC complaint and the University’s
decision to reduce her teaching load.

her protected activity. And this reduction in Barnabas’s
schedule is conspicuous: *106 she had taught at least two
courses in every semester from 1997 until fall 2006. See
Pl.’s Answers at No. 5.10 A reasonable jury could infer
that this sudden change in a previously-consistent
schedule, issued at the first opportunity the University had
to reduce Barnabas’s teaching load after she filed an
EEOC complaint, was the result of retaliation.11
Because Barnabas has provided evidence that UDC’s
non-retaliatory explanation for its decision to reduce her
schedule was false, and because a temporal proximity
exists between Barnabas’s protected activity and the
University’s adverse employment action, a reasonable
jury could find that the University reduced Barnabas’s
teaching load in retaliation for her filing an EEOC
complaint. Accordingly, the Court will deny summary
judgment on Barnabas’s fall 2006 retaliation claim.12

[16] [17] [18] [19]

Barnabas filed her EEOC complaint in late
January 2006, and the University reduced her teaching
load in August of that year.9 Generally, an approximately
seven-month delay between protected activity and an
adverse employment action does not suggest any causal
connection between the two. See Buggs v. Powell, 293
F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (seven-month gap “is
not, by itself, sufficient to establish an inference of
discrimination”). But “[e]specially where a defendant
retaliates at the first opportunity that is presented, a
plaintiff will not be foreclosed from making out a prima
facie case despite a substantial gap in time.”
Pardo–Kronemann v. Jackson, 541 F.Supp.2d 210, 218
(D.D.C.2008). Here, the University has not disputed
Barnabas’s assertion that fall 2006 was the first
opportunity for it to reduce her teaching load following

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and
deny in part UDC’s motion for summary judgment. A
separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

All Citations
686 F.Supp.2d 95, 255 Ed. Law Rep. 795

Footnotes
1

Barnabas also suggests that UDC discriminated against her by failing to hire her for other full-time positions. See Pl.’s
Opp’n at 4. She has offered no evidence or argument as to those other allegedly discriminatory acts, however.

2

The record does not identify the vacancy number for this position.

3

In light of this conclusion that Barnabas’s claims were not timely filed with the EEOC, the Court need not address
UDC’s argument that Barnabas was not qualified for the position.

4

UDC initially sought to hire two professors for this vacancy, but ultimately withdrew the funding for the second
position. Id. Barnabas does not contend that UDC’s decision not to hire a second professor for this vacancy was
discriminatory.

5

Because it concludes that Barnabas has not shown any evidence of discrimination, the Court need not address UDC’s
argument, made for the first time in its reply brief, that Barnabas failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies
with respect to this vacancy. See Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. [Docket Entry 38] (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 3.
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6

In its reply brief, UDC states that Barnabas did in fact apply for vacancy number 05–74. See Pl.’s Reply at 4 n. 2. This
appears to be in error, as Barnabas herself concedes that she did not apply for the position. See Barnabas Depo. at
85:1–17.

7

Barnabas’s complaint alleges that UDC’s “policy and practice in defining and in filling regular full time professor
vacancies in its Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences is based upon age.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 16. There
is nothing in the record to support this allegation, and in any event Barnabas appears to have abandoned it.

8

UDC also asserts in its motion for summary judgment that Barnabas’s reduced teaching load was “a function of the
University’s limited need for her to teach during that time period.” Def.’s Mot. at 23. This explanation, offered without
citation, cannot supply an additional non-retaliatory explanation, as the record lacks any evidence of the University’s
teaching needs. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“An articulation not admitted into evidence will not
suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden [to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation] merely
through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.”).

9

The record is silent as to when UDC decided to reduce Barnabas’s teaching load. Accordingly, the Court assumes that
August 2006—the start of the fall semester, see Barnabas Depo. 103:8–9—is the relevant date for this inquiry.

10

UDC claims that there is no evidence that individuals with control over Barnabas’s schedule were even aware of her
protected activity. See Def.’s Mot. at 22; see also Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (“We agree that Jones’s supervisors could
not have retaliated against him unless they had knowledge of his protected activity.”). But to survive summary
judgment, a plaintiff “needn’t provide direct evidence that his supervisors knew of his protected activity; he need only
offer circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support an inference that they did.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 679. Here,
UDC has offered no evidence that her supervisors did not know of plaintiff’s protected activity. And the fact that
Barnabas’s schedule was uncharacteristically reduced following her protected activity—evidence that supports an
inference of retaliatory motive—“necessarily can support an inference of mere knowledge.” See id.

11

In a response to one of UDC’s interrogatories, Barnabas states that “[Department Chair Dr. Freddie] Dixon’s
relationship with Barnabas changed from supportive to hostile ... in particular after Barnabas raised, through her
attorney, claims of age discrimination in 2005, and filed EEOC charges in January 2006. Dixon then avoided direct
communication with Barnabas and channeled communications with Barnabas through Dixon’s secretary.” Pl.’s
Answers at No. 3. In her deposition taken less than a week later, however, Barnabas stated that these changes in her
relationship with Dixon took place in 2002. See Barnabas Depo. at 111:19–14:13. And Barnabas further clarified that
Dixon never told her that all communications with her needed to go through Dixon’s secretary. Barnabas Depo. at
113:14–17. In light of these contradictions, which the parties do not address, in resolving this motion the Court has not
considered Barnabas’s suggestion in her interrogatory response that Dixon’s attitude towards her changed after she
filed her EEOC complaint.

12

The Court will also deny summary judgment on Barnabas’s claim that UDC retaliated against her by assigning her only
one course in spring 2007. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. UDC contends that Barnabas failed to bring this allegation before the
EEOC, see Def.’s Mot. at 14, 23, but this alleged retaliation is merely a continuation of the alleged unlawful behavior
Barnabas identified in her amended EEOC complaint. Given the Court’s conclusion that the University’s reduction of
Barnabas’s courseload in fall 2006 may have been retaliatory, it cannot conclude as a matter of law that the continued
reduction in her courseload the following semester was not also unlawful. The Court does, however, grant summary
judgment as to any claim that the University retaliated against Barnabas by not awarding her any courses to teach in
summer 2007. See Amend. Compl. ¶ 12. Barnabas concedes that in summer 2007 “her disabilities developed so as to
prevent her from seeking or accepting any further work.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7; see also Barnabas Depo. at 104:10–105:5.
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